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LEIBNIZ’S LAWS OF CONTINUITY AND
HOMOGENEITY
MIKHAIL G. KATZ AND DAVID M. SHERRY
Abstract. We explore Leibniz’s understanding of the differential
calculus, and argue that his methods were more coherent than is
generally recognized. The foundations of the historical infinitesi-
mal calculus of Newton and Leibniz have been a target of numerous
criticisms. Some of the critics believed to have found logical fal-
lacies in its foundations. We present a detailed textual analysis
of Leibniz’s seminal text Cum Prodiisset, and argue that Leibniz’s
system for differential calculus was free of contradictions.
Contents
1. From the characteristica universalis to ideal entities 2
2. Cum Prodiisset 4
2.1. Law of Continuity, with examples 4
2.2. Status transitus 5
2.3. Mathematical implementation of status transitus 7
2.4. Assignable versus unassignable 11
2.5. Souverain principe 11
3. Assignable and inassignable quantities 12
3.1. Relation of being infinitely close 12
3.2. Transcendental law of homogeneity 13
4. Justification of the product rule 13
5. Was Leibniz’s system for differential calculus, consistent? 14
Acknowledgments 16
References 16
2000 Mathematics Subject Classification. Primary 26E35; Secondary 01A85,
03A05 .
Key words and phrases. continuum; Hewitt; infinitesimal; law of continuity; law
of homogeneity; Leibniz;  Los´; Robinson; standard part; Stevin; transfer principle.
1
2 MIKHAIL G. KATZ AND DAVID M. SHERRY
1. From the characteristica universalis to ideal entities
Leibniz envisioned the creation of a universal language, characteris-
tica universalis , ambitiously designed to serve as the vehicle for deduc-
tion and discovery in all fields of knowledge. Couturat [10] pointed out
in 1901 that in Leibniz’s vision, the infinitesimal calculus was but the
first salvo, or sample, of his characteristica universalis .
Leibniz’s vision of the ideal nature of mathematical entities was re-
markably modern. His description of infinitesimals as fictional entities
shocked his disciples J. Bernoulli, l’Hoˆpital, and Varignon. And his in-
finitesimals certainly appeared as “Mysteries” to critics such as Berke-
ley, whose empiricist philosophy tolerated no conceptual innovations,
like infinitesimals, without an empirical counterpart or referent:
Yet some there are, who, though they shrink at all other
Mysteries, make no difficulty of their own, who strain
at a Gnat and swallow a Camel (Berkeley 1734, [1, sec-
tion XXXIV]).
While today we are puzzled by Berkeley’s rigid rejection of the idea
of an infinitely divisible continuum, he also articulated a specifically
logical criticism of the calculus (see Sherry 1987 [47]), alleging that the
system suffered from logical flaws and even contradictions. Even today,
many historians believe Berkeley’s criticism to have been on target.
Not even Robinson escaped this trend, praising Berkeley’s criticism of
the foundations of the calculus as “a brilliant exposure of their logical
inconsistencies” (Robinson 1966 [46, p. 280]).
We argue that, contrary to Berkeley’s view, Leibniz’s system for the
differential calculus was robust and free of contradiction. Leibniz ar-
ticulated a set of coherent heuristic procedures for his calculus. Thus,
Leibniz’s system incorporated versatile heuristic principles such as his
law of continuity and laws of homogeneity, which were amenable, in
the ripeness of time, to implementation as general principles governing
the manipulation of modern infinitesimal and infinitely large quanti-
ties, such as the transfer principle and the standard part principle.
Kanovei [21] and others performed similar reconstructions of Euler’s
work.
We will draw on Leibniz’s work, more specifically his Cum Prodiisset,
so as to argue for the consistency of Leibniz’s system for the differential
calculus.1 We will also draw on the work of Leibniz historians Bos,
Ferraro, Horva´th, Knobloch, and Laugwitz.
1The text Cum Prodiisset sheds more light on foundational issues than the terser
1684 text Nova methodus pro maximis et minimis . . . [36], so named because the
determination of maxima and minima was one of the central problems of analysis
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Berkeley’s attack on infinitesimal calculus focused specifically on the
product rule as well as the derivation of polynomials. Once the logical
contradiction, alleged by Berkeley, is resolved in the context of the
product rule (see Section 4), it can similarly be resolved (namely by
applying the transcendental law of homogeneity) in all other contexts.
In a seminal 1974 study of Leibnizian methodology, Bos described a
pair of distinct approaches to justifying the calculus:
Leibniz considered two different approaches to the foun-
dations of the calculus; one connected with the classical
methods of proof by “exhaustion”, the other in connec-
tion with a law of continuity (Bos [5, item 4.2, p. 55]).
The first approach relies on an Archimedean “exhaustion” methodol-
ogy. We will therefore refer to it as the A-methodology. The other
methodology exploits infinitesimals and the law of continuity. We will
refer to it as the B-methodology, in an allusion to Johann Bernoulli,
who, having learned an infinitesimal methodology from Leibniz, never
wavered from it.
Knobloch explains the role of Leibniz’s law of continuity in the fol-
lowing terms:
In his treatise Leibniz used a dozen rules which consti-
tute his arithmetic of the infinite. He just applied them
without demonstrating them, only relying on the law of
continuity : The rules of the finite remains valid in the
domain of the infinite (Knobloch [31, p. 67]).
Laugwitz pointed out that Leibniz’s law of continuity
contains an a priori assumption: our mathematical uni-
verse of discourse contains both finite objects and infi-
nite ones (Laugwitz 1992, [33, p. 145]).
What is the ontological status of such infinitary (infinitesimal or infi-
nite) objects in Leibniz’s theory? Leibniz’s was a remarkably modern
insight that mathematical entities need not have a referent , or empiri-
cal counterpart. The fictional nature of infinitesimals was stressed by
Leibniz in 1706:
Philosophically speaking, I no more admit magnitudes
infinitely small than infinitely great . . . I take both for
mental fictions, as more convenient ways of speaking,
and adapted to calculation, just like imaginary roots
as practiced at the time, with leading scholars having composed works of similar
titles (see e.g., Fermat [12]).
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are in algebra. (Leibniz to Des Bosses, 11 march 1706;
in Gerhardt [16, II, p. 305])
Infinitesimals, like imaginaries, were well-founded fictions to Leibniz.
The nature of Leibniz’s infinitesimals is further clarified by Ferraro,
who analyzes a lengthy quotation from Leibniz’s famous letter [39] to
Varignon of 1702 (which we do not reproduce here to save space), in
the following terms:
According to Leibniz, imaginary numbers, infinite num-
bers, infinitesimals, the powers whose exponents were
not “ordinary” numbers and other mathematical no-
tions are not mere inventions; they are auxiliary and
ideal quantities that [. . . ] serve to shorten the path of
thought (Ferraro [13, p. 35]).
On Ferraro’s view, Leibniz’s infinitesimals enjoy an ideal ontological
status similar to that of the complex numbers, surd (irrational) expo-
nents, and other ideal quantities.
In the next section, we will examine Leibniz’s foundational stance as
expressed in his seminal text Cum Prodiisset.
2. Cum Prodiisset
Leibniz’s text Cum Prodiisset [38] (translated by Child [9]) dates
from around 1701 according to modern scholars. The text is of crucial
importance in understanding Leibniz’s foundational stance. We will
analyze it in detail in this section.
2.1. Law of Continuity, with examples. Leibniz formulates his law
of continuity in the following terms:
Proposito quocunque transitu continuo in aliquem ter-
minum desinente, liceat raciocinationem communem in-
stituere, qua ultimus terminus comprehendatur (Leibniz
[38, p. 40]).
The passage can be translated as follows:
In any supposed continuous transition, ending in any
terminus, it is permissible to institute a general reason-
ing, in which the final terminus may also be included.
We have deliberately avoided using the term limit in our translation.2
2This is consonant with Child’s translation: “In any supposed transition, ending
in any terminus, it is permissible to institute a general reasoning, in which the final
terminus may also be included” [9, p. 147]. We have reinstated the adjective con-
tinuous modifying transition (deleted by Child possibly in an attempt to downplay
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In fact, translating terminus as limit would involve a methodological
error, because the term limit misleadingly suggests its modern technical
meaning of a real-valued operation applied to sequences or functions.
In a similar vein, Bos notes that
the fundamental concepts of the Leibnizian infinitesimal
calculus can best be understood as extrapolations to the
actually infinite of concepts of the calculus of finite se-
quences. I use the term “extrapolation” here to preclude
any idea of taking a limit (Bos [5, p. 13]).3
Leibniz gives several examples of the application of his Law of Con-
tinuity. We will focus on the following three examples.
(1) In the context of a discussion of parallel lines, he writes:
when the straight line BP ultimately becomes parallel
to the straight line VA, even then it converges toward
it or makes an angle with it, only that the angle is
then infinitely small (Child [9, p. 148]).
(2) Invoking the idea that the term equality may refer to equality
up to an infinitesimal error, Leibniz writes:
when one straight line4 is equal to another, it is said
to be unequal to it, but that the difference is infinitely
small [9, p. 148].5
(3) Finally, a conception of a parabola expressed by means of an
ellipse with an infinitely removed focal point is evoked in the
following terms:
a parabola is the ultimate form of an ellipse, in which
the second focus is at an infinite distance from the
given focus nearest to the given vertex [9, p. 148].
2.2. Status transitus. We return to our analysis of the law of con-
tinuity as formulated in Cum Prodiisset. Leibniz introduces his next
observation by the clause “of course it is really true that”, and notes
that “straight lines which are parallel never meet” [9, p. 148]; that
“things which are absolutely equal have a difference which is abso-
lutely nothing” [9, p. 148]; and that “a parabola is not an ellipse at
a perceived logical circularity of defining a law of continuity in terms of continuity
itself).
3Bos goes on specifically to criticize the Bourbaki’s limite wording “(Leibniz) se
tient tre`s pre`s du calcul des diffe´rences, dont son calcul diffe´rentiel se de´duit par
un passage a` la limite” (Bourbaki [6, p. 208]).
4Here Leibniz is using the term line in its generic meaning of a segment.
5Equality up to an infinitesimal is a state of transition from inequality to equality
(this anticipates the transcendental law of homogeneity dealt with in Section 3).
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all” [9, p .149]. These remarks would seem to rule out the wondrous
entities of the previous subsection. How does one, then, account for
these examples? Leibniz provides an explanation in terms of a state of
transition (status transitus in the original Latin [38, p. 42]):
a state of transition may be imagined, or one of evanes-
cence, in which indeed there has not yet arisen exact
equality . . . or parallelism, but in which it is passing
into such a state, that the difference is less than any as-
signable quantity; also that in this state there will still
remain some difference, . . . some angle, but in each case
one that is infinitely small; and the distance of the point
of intersection, or the variable focus, from the fixed fo-
cus will be infinitely great, and the parabola may be
included under the heading of an ellipse [9, p. 149].
A state of transition in which “there has not yet arisen exact equal-
ity” refers to example (2) in Subsection 2.1; “parallelism” refers to
example (1); including parabola under the heading of ellipse is exam-
ple (3).
Thus, the term terminus encompasses the status transitus, involving
a passage into an assignable entity, while being as yet inassignable.
Translating terminus as limit amounts to translating it as an assignable
entity, the antonym of the meaning intended by Leibniz.
The observation that Leibniz’s status transitus is an inassignable
quantity is confirmed by Leibniz’s conceding that its metaphysical sta-
tus is “open to question”:
whether such a state of instantaneous transition from
inequality to equality, . . . from convergence [i.e., lines
meeting–the authors] to parallelism, or anything of the
sort, can be sustained in a rigorous or metaphysical
sense, or whether infinite extensions successively greater
and greater, or infinitely small ones successively less and
less, are legitimate considerations, is a matter that I own
to be possibly open to question [9, p. 149].
Yet Leibniz asserts that infinitesimals may be utilized independently
of metaphysical controversies:
but for him who would discuss these matters, it is not
necessary to fall back upon metaphysical controversies,
such as the composition of the continuum, or to make
geometrical matters depend thereon [9, p. 149-150].
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To summarize, Leibniz holds that the inassignable status of status tran-
situs is no obstacle to its effective use in geometry. The point is reit-
erated in the next paragraph:
If any one wishes to understand these [i.e. the infinitely
great or the infinitely small–the authors] as the ultimate
things, or as truly infinite, it can be done, and that
too without falling back upon a controversy about the
reality of extensions, or of infinite continuums in general,
or of the infinitely small, ay, even though he think that
such things are utterly impossible; it will be sufficient
simply to make use of them as a tool that has advantages
for the purpose of the calculation, just as the algebraists
retain imaginary roots with great profit [9, p. 150].
Leibniz has just asserted the possibility of themathematical infinite: “it
can be done”, without philosophical commitments as to its ontological
reality.
2.3. Mathematical implementation of status transitus. We will
illustrate Leibniz’s concept of status transitus by implementing it math-
ematically in the three examples mentioned by Leibniz.
In Subsection 2.2, we mentioned that Leibniz viewed infinitesimals
as fictions, and so his methods avoided any metaphysical commitments.
Ishiguro (1990, [20]) and others viewed a Leibnizian infinitesimal as a
logical fiction, involving a syncategorematic paraphrase with a hidden
quantifier applied to ordinary real values. We have argued against the
syncategorematic interpretation in [29]. Rather, Leibnizian infinitesi-
mals are pure fictions akin to imaginaries. Thus, Leibniz exploited in-
finitely large and infinitely small quantities in the same sense in which
Albert Girard (1595-1632) and others exploited imaginary roots in or-
der to simplify algebra. In neither case is there a commitment to cor-
responding mathematical entities. Thus, Leibniz anticipates modern
formalist positions such as Hilbert’s and Robinson’s.
Of course, the structural properties of Leibniz’s infinite and infinitely
small quantities are different from those of modern day infinitesimals.
Nonetheless, modern theories of infinitesimals are a way of implement-
ing Leibniz’s heuristic procedures. Thus, Example (2) can be illus-
trated as follows. Leibniz denotes a finite positive quantity by
(d)x
8 MIKHAIL G. KATZ AND DAVID M. SHERRY
(Bos [5, p. 57] replaced this by dx). The assignable quantity (d)x
passes via infinitesimal dx on its way to absolute 0. Then the infinites-
imal dx is the status transitus. Zero is merely the assignable shadow 6
of the infinitesimal. Then a line (i.e., segment) of length 2x + dx will
be equal to one of length 2x, up to an infinitesimal. This particular
status transitus is the foundation rock of the Leibnizian definition of
the differential quotient.
Example (1) of parallel lines can be elaborated as follows. Let us
follow Leibniz in building the line through (0, 1) parallel to the x-axis
in the plane. Line LH with y-intercept 1 and x-intercept H is given
by y = 1 − x
H
. For infinite H , the line LH has negative infinitesimal
slope, meets the x-axis at an infinite point, and forms an infinitesimal
angle with the x-axis at the point where they meet. We will denote
by st(x) the assignable (i.e., real) shadow7 of a finite x. Then every
finite point (x, y) ∈ LH satisfies
st(x, y) = (st(x), st(y))
=
(
st(x), st
(
1− x
H
))
= (st(x), 1).
Hence the finite portion of LH is infinitely close to the line y = 1 parallel
to the x-axis, which is its shadow. Thus, the parallel line is constructed
by varying the oblique line depending on a parameter. Such variation
passes via the status transitus defined by an infinite value of H .
To implement example (3), let’s follow Leibniz in deforming an el-
lipse, via a status transitus, into a parabola. The ellipse with vertex
(apex) at (0,−1) and with foci at the origin and at (0;H) is given by
√
x2 + y2 +
√
x2 + (y −H)2 = H + 2 (2.1)
We square (2.1) to obtain
x2 + y2 + x2 + (H − y)2 + 2
√
(x2 + y2)(x2 + (H − y)2) = H2 + 4H + 4
(2.2)
We move the radical to one side
2
√
(x2 + y2)(x2 + (H − y)2) = H2+4H+4−
(
x2 + y2 + x2 + (H − y)2
)
(2.3)
6See footnote 7.
7Here “st” stands for the standard part function in the context of the hyper-
reals. Of course, Leibniz used neither the term “shadow” nor the “st” notation.
Rather, these notations from modern infinitesimal analysis implement mathemati-
cally a heuristic principle of Leibniz’s called the transcendental law of homogeneity,
discussed in Section 3.
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and square again. After cancellation we see that (2.1) is equivalent to
(
y + 2 + 2
H
)2
− (x2 + y2)
(
1 + 4
H
+ 4
H2
)
= 0. (2.4)
The calculation (2.1) through (2.4) depends on habits of general rea-
soning such as:
• squaring undoes a radical;
• the binomial formula;
• terms in an equation can be transfered to the other side; etc.
General reasoning of this type is familiar in the realm of ordinary as-
signable (finite) numbers, but why does it remain valid when applied
to the, fictional, “realm” of inassignable (infinite or infinitesimal) num-
bers? The validity of transfering such general reasoning originally in-
stituted in the finite realm, to the “realm” of the infinite is precisely
the content of Leibniz’s law of continuity.8
We therefore apply Leibniz’s law of continuity to equation (2.4) for an
infinite H . The resulting entity is still an ellipse of sorts, to the extent
that it satisfies all of the equations (2.1) through (2.4). However, this
entity is no longer finite. It represents a Leibnizian status transitus
between ellipse and parabola. This status transitus has foci at the
origin and at an infinitely distant point (0, H). Assuming x and y are
finite, we set x0 = st(x) and y0 = st(y), to obtain an equation for a
real shadow of this entity:
st
((
y + 2 + 2
H
)2
− (x2 + y2)
(
1 + 4
H
+ 4
H2
))
=
=
(
y0 + 2 + st
(
2
H
))2
−
(
x20 + y
2
0
) (
1 + st
(
4
H
+ 4
H2
))
= (y0 + 2)
2
−
(
x20 + y
2
0
)
= 0.
Simplifying, we obtain
y0 =
x20
4
− 1. (2.5)
Thus, the finite portion of the status transitus (2.4) is infinitely close
to its shadow (2.5), namely the real parabola y = x
2
4
− 1. This is the
kind of payoff Leibniz is seeking with his law of continuity.
Some historians have been reluctant to interpret Leibniz’s mathemat-
ics in terms of modern mathematical theories. Thus, Dauben presents
8When the general reasoning being transfered to the infinite “realm” is general-
ized to encompass arbitrary elementary properties (i.e. first order properties), one
obtains the  Los´-Robinson transfer principle.
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a list of authors, including Detlef Laugwitz, who “have used nonstan-
dard analysis to rehabilitate or ‘vindicate’ earlier infinitesimalists”, and
concludes:
Leibniz, Euler, and Cauchy [. . . ] had, in the views
of some commentators, “Robinsonian” nonstandard in-
finitesimals in mind from the beginning. The most de-
tailed and methodically [sic] sophisticated of such treat-
ments to date is that provided by Imre Lakatos; in what
follows, it is his analysis of Cauchy that is emphasized
(Dauben 1988, [11, p. 179]).
However, Lakatos’s treatment was certainly not “the most detailed and
methodically sophisticated” one by the time Dauben’s text appeared
in 1988. Thus, in 1987, Laugwitz had published a detailed scholarly
study of Cauchy in Historia Mathematica (Laugwitz [32]). Laugwitz’s
text in Historia Mathematica seems to be the published version of
his 1985 preprint Cauchy and infinitesimals. Laugwitz’s 1985 preprint
does appear in Dauben’s bibliography (Dauben, 1988 [11, p. 199]), in-
dicating that Dauben was familiar with it. It is odd to suggest, as
Dauben seems to, that a scholarly study published in Historia Mathe-
matica would countenance a view that Leibniz and Cauchy could have
had “‘Robinsonian’ nonstandard infinitesimals in mind from the begin-
ning”. Surely Dauben has committed a strawman fallacy here.
To a historian, the claim that Leibniz’s differential calculus was free
of logical fallacies may seem analogous to claiming that the circle can
be squared9 –but only if the historian embraces the triumviratist story
of analysis as an ineluctable march from incoherent infinitesimalism
toward the yawning heights of Weierstrassian epsilontics.
Rather, Lakatos, Laugwitz, Br˚ating (2007, [8]) and others have ar-
gued that infinitesimals as employed by Leibniz, Euler, and Cauchy
have found a set-theoretic implementation in the framework of modern
theories of infinitesimals. The existence of such implementations indi-
cates that the historical infinitesimals were less prone to contradiction
than has been routinely maintained by triumvirate historians.10 The
issue is dealt with in more detail by Katz & Katz [25], [23], [26], [24];
B laszczyk et al. [2]; Borovik et al. [3]; Katz & Leichtnam [27]; and
Katz, Schaps, & Shnider [28].
9Such was indeed the tenor of a recent referee report, see
http://u.cs.biu.ac.il/∼katzmik/straw2.html
10C. Boyer refers to Cantor, Dedekind, and Weierstrass as “the great triumvi-
rate”, see [7, p. 298].
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2.4. Assignable versus unassignable. In this section, we will retain
the term “unassignable” from Child’s translation [9] (inassignabiles in
the original Latin, see [38, p. 46]). After introducing finite quanti-
ties (d)x, (d)y, (d)z, Leibniz notes that
the unassignables dx and dy may be substituted for
them by a method of supposition even in the case when
they are evanescent (Child [9, p. 153]).
Leibniz proceeds to derive his multiplicative law in the case ay = xv.
Simplifying the differential quotient, Leibniz obtains
ady
dx
=
xdv
dx
+ v + dv. (2.6)
At this point Leibniz proposes to transfer “the matter, as we may, to
straight lines that never become evanescent”, obtaining11
a (d)y
(d)x
=
x (d)v
(d)x
+ v + dv. (2.7)
The advantage of (2.7) over (2.6) is that the expressions (d)y
(d)x
and (d)v
(d)x
are assignable (real). At this stage, Leibniz points out that “dv is
superfluous”. The reason given is that “it alone can become evanes-
cent”. The transcendental law of homogeneity (see Section 3) is not
mentioned explicitly in Cum Prodiisset ; therefore the discussion of this
step necessarily remains a bit vague. Discarding the dv term, one ob-
tains the expected product formula a (d)y
(d)x
= x (d)v
(d)x
+ v in this case. Note
that thinking of the left hand side of (2.7) as the assignable shadow
of the right hand side is consistent with Leibniz’s example (2) (see
Subsection 2.1).
2.5. Souverain principe. In a 2 feb. 1702 letter to Varignon, Leibniz
formulated the law of continuity as follows:
[. . . ] et il se trouve que les re`gles du fini re´ussissent
dans l’infini comme s’il y avait des atomes (c’est a` dire
des e´le´ments assignables de la nature) quoiqu’il n’y en
ait point la matie`re e´tant actuellement sousdivise´e sans
fin; et que vice versa les re`gles de l’infini re´ussissent
dans le fini, comme s’il y’avait des infiniment petits
me´taphysiques, quoiqu’on n’en n’ait point besoin; et que
11Child incorrectly transcribes formula (2.7) from Gerhardt, replacing the equal-
ity sign in Gerhardt by a plus sign. Note that Leibniz himself used the sign pq (see
McClenon [43, p. 371]).
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la division de la matie`re ne parvienne jamais a` des par-
celles infiniment petites: c’est parce que tout se gou-
verne par raison, et qu’autrement il n’aurait point de
science ni re`gle, ce qui ne serait point conforme avec la
nature du souverain principe (Leibniz [39, p. 350]).
This formulation was cited in (Robinson 1966 [46, p. 262]). To sum-
marize: the rules of the finite succeed in the infinite, and conversely.
3. Assignable and inassignable quantities
How did Leibniz view the relation of assignable and inassignable
quantities?
3.1. Relation of being infinitely close. The rule governing infin-
itesimal calculation that Knobloch represents as Leibniz’s rule 2.2,
states:
2.2 x, y finite, x = (y+ infinitely small) ⇐⇒ x− y ≈ 0
(not assignable difference) (Knobloch [31, p. 67]).
Here the pair of parallel wavy lines represents the relation of being
infinitely close. Leibnizian assignable quantities mark locations in what
would be called today an Archimedean continuum, or A-continuum for
short. Such a continuum stems from the 16th century work of Simon
Stevin (1548-1620) [48], [49]. Stevin initiated a systematic approach
to decimal representation of measuring numbers, marking a transition
from a discrete arithmetic as practiced by the Greeks, to the arithmetic
of the continuum taken for granted today (see Malet [42], Naets [45],
and B laszczyk et al. [2]).
Closely related to the distinction between the A- and B-methodologies
is a distinction between two types of continua, which could be called an
A-continuum and a B-continuum. The latter encompasses inassignable
entities such as infinitesimals (in addition to assignable ones), and can
be described as a “thick” continuum.12 On occasion, Leibniz describes
such entities as “incomparable quantities”, and defines them in terms of
the violation of what today is called the Archimedean property. Thus,
Leibniz writes in a letter to l’Hoˆpital:
I call incomparable quantities of which the one can not
become larger than the other if multiplied by any finite
number. This conception is in accordance with the fifth
12The B-continuum can be thought of as “thicker” than the A-continuum be-
cause the B-continuum is, as it were, packed chock-full of numbers, including
infinitesimals.
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definition of the fifth book of Euclid (Leibniz [37, p. 288],
cited in Horva´th [19, p. 63]).13
3.2. Transcendental law of homogeneity. To mediate between as-
signable and inassignable quantities, Leibniz developed an additional
principle called the transcendental law of homogeneity . Leibniz’s tran-
scendental law of homogeneity governs equations involving differentials.
Bos interprets it as follows:
A quantity which is infinitely small with respect to an-
other quantity can be neglected if compared with that
quantity. Thus all terms in an equation except those
of the highest order of infinity, or the lowest order of
infinite smallness, can be discarded. For instance,
a+ dx = a (3.1)
dx+ ddy = dx
etc. The resulting equations satisfy this [. . . ] require-
ment of homogeneity (Bos [5, p. 33] paraphrasing Leib-
niz 1710, [40, p. 381-382]).
The title of Leibniz’s 1710 text is Symbolismus memorabilis calculi alge-
braici et infinitesimalis in comparatione potentiarum et differentiarum,
et de lege homogeneorum transcendentali. The inclusion of the tran-
scendental law of homogeneity (lex homogeneorum transcendentalis) in
the title of the text attests to the importance Leibniz attached to this
law.
How did Leibniz use the transcendental law of homogeneity in de-
veloping the calculus? In Section 4, we will illustrate an application
of the transcendental law of homogeneity to the particular example of
the derivation of the product rule.
4. Justification of the product rule
The issue is the justification of the last step in the following calcu-
lation:
d(uv) = (u+ du)(v + dv)− uv = udv + vdu+ du dv
= udv + vdu.
(4.1)
The last step in the calculation (4.1), namely
udv + vdu+ du dv = udv + vdu
13Horva´th notes that Leibniz is actually referring to the fourth definition of the
fifth book.
14 MIKHAIL G. KATZ AND DAVID M. SHERRY
is an application of Leibniz’s law of homogeneity.14
In his 1701 text Cum Prodiisset [38, p. 46-47], Leibniz presents an
alternative justification of the product rule (see Bos [5, p. 58]). Here
he divides by dx and argues with differential quotients rather than
differentials. We analyzed Leibniz’s calculation in Subsection 2.4. Ad-
justing Leibniz’s notation to fit with (4.1), we obtain an equivalent
calculation15
d(uv)
dx
=
(u+ du)(v + dv)− uv
dx
=
udv + vdu+ du dv
dx
=
udv + vdu
dx
+
du dv
dx
=
udv + vdu
dx
.
Under suitable conditions the term du dv
dx
is infinitesimal, and therefore
the last step
udv + vdu
dx
+
du dv
dx
= u
dv
dx
+ v
du
dx
is legitimized as a special case of the transcendental law of homogene-
ity, which interprets the equality sign in (3.1) as the relation of being
infinitely close, i.e., an equality up to infinitesimal error. Note that the
use of the equality sign “=” to denote a non-symmetric relation of dis-
carding the “inhomogeneous” terms as in (3.1) and (4.1) should hardly
shock the modern reader used to the “big-O” notation: we write sin x =
O(1), but we would certainly not write O(1) = sin x. Leibniz’s tran-
scendental law of homogeneity involved such an “asymmetric” relation,
since it replaced an inassignable quantity such as 2x + dx by the as-
signable quantity 2x.
5. Was Leibniz’s system for differential calculus,
consistent?
Berkeley’s logical criticism of the calculus is that the evanescent
increment is first assumed to be non-zero to set up an algebraic expres-
sion, and then treated as zero in discarding the terms that contained
that increment when the increment is said to vanish. The criticism,
14Leibniz had two laws of homogeneity, one for dimension and the other for the
order of infinitesimalness. Bos notes that they ‘disappeared from later develop-
ments’ [5, p. 35], referring to Euler and Lagrange.
15The special case treated by Leibniz is u(x) = x. This limitation does not affect
the conceptual structure of the argument.
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Figure 1. Zooming in on infinitesimal ǫ (here st(±ǫ) = 0)
however, involves a misunderstanding of Leibniz’s method. The rebut-
tal of Berkeley’s criticism is that the evanescent increment need not be
“treated as zero”, but, rather, merely discarded through an application
of the transcendental law of homogeneity by Leibniz, as illustrated in
the previous section in the case of the product rule.
While consistent, Leibniz’s system unquestionably relied on heuristic
principles such as the laws of continuity and homogeneity, and would
thus fall short of a standard of rigor if measured by today’s criteria.
On the other hand, the consistency and resilience of Leibniz’s system
is confirmed through the development of modern implementations of
Leibniz’s heuristic principles. Thus, in the 1940s, Hewitt [18] developed
a modern implementation of a hyperreal B-continuum extending R, by
means of a technique referred to today as the ultrapower construction.
We will denote such a B-continuum by the new symbol IIR (“thick-R”).
Denoting by IIR
∞
the subset of IIR consisting of inverses of nonzero
infinitesimals, we obtain a partition IIR = IIR<∞ ∪ IIR∞ where IIR<∞ is
the complement of IIR
∞
. We then have the standard part function
st : IIR<∞ → R, (5.1)
illustrated in Figure 1. Note that the hyperreals can be constructed out
of integers (see Borovik, Jin, & Katz [4]). The traditional quotient con-
struction using Cauchy sequences, usually attributed to Cantor (and
is actually due to Me´ray 1869, [44] who published three years earlier
than E. Heine), can be factored through the hyperreals (see Giordano
& Katz [17]). In 1955,  Los´ [41] proved his celebrated theorem on ultra-
products, implying in particular that elementary (more generally, first-
order) statements over R are true if and only if they are true over IIR,
yielding a modern implementation of the Leibnizian law of continuity .
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Such a result is equivalent to what is known in the literature as the
transfer principle (see Keisler [30]). The map that associates to every
finite element of IIR, the real number infinitely close to it, is known
in the literature as the standard part function (5.1) (alternatively, the
shadow). Such a map is a mathematical implementation of the Leib-
nizian transcendental law of homogeneity.
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